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WILL THE SUPREME COURT RECOVER ITS OWN
FUMBLE? HOW ALSTON CAN REPAIR THE DAMAGE
RESULTING FROM NCAA’S SPORTS LEAGUE
EXEMPTION
Alan J. Meese*

I. INTRODUCTION
Horizontal restraints are unlawful per se unless a court can
identify some redeeming virtue that such restraints may create. In
National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma (“NCAA”),1 the Supreme Court rejected this
standard, refusing to condemn horizontal restraints on price and
output imposed by the NCAA without specifying any possible
redeeming virtues.2 The Court emphasized that other restraints not
before the Court were necessary to create and maintain athletic
competition like that supervised by the NCAA.3 This exemption for
sports leagues ensures that all restraints imposed by such entities
merit Rule of Reason scrutiny, regardless of how harmful they
appear.
Building on a forthcoming article,4 this Essay contends that
NCAA’s sports league exemption contravenes traditional antitrust
principles, including the ancillary restraints doctrine (which NCAA
ignored). This Essay also argues that the exemption increases the
number of false negatives and potentially impedes the conduct of Rule
of Reason analysis. Finally, this Essay explains how the exemption
inspired and informed an ill-advised doctrinal innovation, the socalled “Quick Look” methodology of Rule of Reason analysis, whereby
courts condemn certain restraints “in the twinkling of an eye.”5 Some
lower courts have recently extrapolated from this approach and
exempted restraints limiting rivalry for the services of student
*. Ball Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for the Study of Law and
Markets, William & Mary Law School. The author thanks the editors of the Wake
Forest Law Review, both print and online editions, for their thoughtful edits and
diligent efforts.
1. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
2. Infra Part III.
3. Id.
4. See Alan J. Meese, Requiem for a Lightweight: How NCAA Continues to
Distort Antitrust Doctrine, 56 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2021).
5. See Areeda, infra note 78, at 37–38.
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athletes from Rule of Reason scrutiny, rendering such restraints
lawful per se.6
The United States Supreme Court is currently reviewing the
Ninth Circuit’s holding in National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Alston, which condemned NCAA regulations limiting the size of
athletic scholarships.7 This Essay provides the Alston Court with a
roadmap for eliminating the sports league exemption, thereby placing
such restraints on equal footing with restraints imposed by other
entities. The Essay also advises the Court to reject lower court
decisions that built upon the Quick Look doctrine and have treated
restraints governing student athlete eligibility as lawful per se, thus
exempting them from Rule of Reason scrutiny. Finally, the Essay
concludes that the restraints before the Court in Alston may well
produce cognizable antitrust benefits by overcoming the market
failure that would result from unbridled rivalry for the services of
student athletes. The Essay submits that the Court should articulate
a Rule of Reason methodology in Alston that reflects the nontechnological nature of such efficiencies.
II. THE RULE OF REASON AND THE PER SE RULE
The Sherman Act bans agreements “in restraint of trade.”8 In
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States,9 the Court read the
Act to prohibit only agreements that restrain trade “unreasonably,”10
i.e., produce monopoly or its consequences: higher prices, reduced
output. and/or reduced quality.11 Ordinary application of this Rule
of Reason is fact-intensive, requiring plaintiffs to establish that the
restraint produces concrete antitrust harm.12 But certain restraints
are “unlawful per se,” and do not warrant full-blown analysis.13 In
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States (“NPR”), the Court
articulated a two-part standard for determining whether restraints
in a particular category are always unreasonable and thus unlawful
per se.14 NPR requires courts to ask two questions about restraints
in the category: do such restraints produce a “pernicious effect on
competition” and, if so, do they also always lack redeeming virtues.15
Despite NPR’s reference to pernicious effects, application of this
first prong does not require a judicial prediction that restraints will
6. See infra nn.96–98.
7. 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., 141 S.Ct. 1231 (2020)
(mem.).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
9. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
10. Id. at 51.
11. Id. at 52 (listing three “evils which led to the public outcry against
monopolies”).
12. Cont’l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 n.15 (1977).
13. See generally N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States (“NPR“), 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
14. Id. at 5.
15. Id.; see also Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50 (quoting NPR with approval).
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produce actual economic harm.16 Instead, courts treat elimination of
rivalry as itself a “pernicious effect.”17 Numerous garden variety
restraints, including formation of partnerships and restraints
ancillary thereto, produce a “pernicious effect” under this prong.18
Whether this standard condemns a restraint thus turns on the second
prong, namely, whether restraints lack redeeming virtues.19 For
example, price fixing between two independent lawyers is unlawful
per se because such agreements cannot create redeeming virtues.20
But formation of a partnership by the same lawyers might produce
redeeming virtues and thus merits Rule of Reason treatment.21 Both
restraints extinguish horizontal price rivalry. But formation of the
partnership may also produce redeeming virtues.22
The NPR standard post-dates the ancillary restraints doctrine.23
But both doctrines ultimately ask the same question about horizontal
restraints: can eliminating rivalry also produce efficiency benefits?
While the NPR standard takes a categorical approach, the ancillary
restraints doctrine applies case-by-case.24 Repeated applications of
the ancillary restraints doctrine could establish that particular

16. Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003
U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 94–95 (2003) (recognizing that the Court defines
“anticompetitive” broadly).
17. Id. at 94 (explaining that the Court has “equated the term [‘competition’]
with ‘rivalry’ for the purpose of per se analysis, with the result that any
coordination of previously independent activity is anticompetitive”).
18. Id. at 95.
19. Id. at 96.
20. See id. at 96–98.
21. See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price
Fixing and Market Division II, 75 YALE L. J. 373, 383 (1966) (distinguishing
between antitrust’s treatment of naked price fixing and “close-knit combinations”
such as partnerships on this basis); Richard A. Givens, Affirmative Benefits to
Industrial Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 36 IND. L. J. 51, 52–53 (1960)
(concluding that “‘lack of any redeeming virtue’ is the chief distinction between
those kinds of loose-knit combinations which are held in unreasonable restraint
of trade in and of themselves and the close-knit combinations”); Alan J. Meese,
In Praise of All or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust Law Should
Reject the Quick Look, 104 GEO. L.J. 835, 849–51 (2016) (explaining the NPR
standard’s disparate treatment of naked price fixing and the formation of
partnerships).
22. Bork, supra note 21, at 383.
23. See generally United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th
Cir. 1898) (articulating the ancillary restraints doctrine sixty years before NPR).
24. Compare N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States (“NPR”), 356 U.S. 1, 5 (stating
that “[the] principle of per se unreasonableness . . . makes the type of restraints
proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain . . . .”), with Addyston Pipe, 85 F. 271
at 282–83 (illustrating that the “very statement of the rule” implies that the court
must determine whether “the contract [at issue is] one in which there is a main
purpose, to which the covenant in restraint of trade is merely ancillary”).
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categories of restraints never or sometimes produce redeeming
virtues, thus informing application of the NPR standard.25
If restraints cannot produce such virtues, courts may safely
conclude that parties have invested resources to create an agreement
that restricts rivalry with no prospect of efficiencies. This conclusion
implies that the parties believe they can exercise market power.26
Even if the parties are incorrect, condemnation of such restraints does
no harm and deters future price fixing.27
If restraints may produce such virtues, further inquiry is
warranted regarding their ultimate impact. Moreover, a court
assessing such restraints under full-blown Rule of Reason analysis
must begin by assuming that the restraint before it might produce
such benefits and calibrate the methodology of such inquiry
accordingly.
The Court initially recognized very few redeeming virtues,
limiting the category to what Nobel Laureate Oliver Williamson
describes as technological efficiencies.28 Beginning with Continental
T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,29 the Court has repeatedly recognized a
different category of virtues—namely, correction of market failures
that would occur if parties to the restraint had instead continued
unbridled rivalry.30 As this Essay submits, the methodology of fullblown Rule of Reason analysis should turn upon the nature of these
virtues.

25. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982)
(explaining that restraints are condemned as unlawful per se “[o]nce experience
with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence
that the Rule of Reason will condemn it”).
26. See FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 435 n.18
(1990) (“Very few firms that lack power to affect market prices will be sufficiently
foolish to enter into conspiracies to fix prices.”) (quoting R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX, 269 (1978)); Rothery Storage v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 221
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., for the court).
27. Areeda, infra note 78, at 21–22.
28. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, 7
(1985) (“The prevailing orientation toward economic organization [during this
period] was that technological features of firm and market organization were
determinative.”); see also Meese, supra note 16, at 124–32 (documenting how the
Supreme Court relied upon the applied price theory tradition that Williamson
discusses when expanding the scope of the per se rule).
29. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
30. Id. at 55 (explaining how non-standard agreements could ensure
production of services retailers might not provide “in a purely competitive
situation”).
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III. NCAA’S MISAPPLICATION/IGNORANCE OF NPR AND RESULTING
SPORTS LEAGUE EXEMPTION
In Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association,31 the Court evaluated an agreement
setting the price and output of televised college football games.32
Plaintiffs University of Georgia and University of Oklahoma, who
presumably supported restrictions on player compensation,
challenged the price and output restrictions.33 Courts at the time
defined redeeming virtues narrowly in the horizontal context,
banning as unlawful per se restraints that seemed plainly ancillary to
legitimate ventures.34 Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit rejected
automatic condemnation, at least arguendo, and assessed whether
the restraints were ancillary to the NCAA’s legitimate venture.35
Answering this question in the negative, the court condemned the
restraints.36
The defendants reiterated their invocation of the ancillary
restraints doctrine in the Supreme Court in NCAA.37 However, the
Court did not mention the NPR standard or the ancillary concept.
Thus, the Court did not ask whether the restraints might produce
redeeming virtues or enhance the efficiency of a valid venture.
Instead, the Court immunized the restraints before it from per se
condemnation because the NCAA had adopted other restraints not
before the Court that would survive per se condemnation.38 Such
other restraints included horizontal agreements ensuring that
players were bona fide students and were not semi-professional
athletes that vaguely associated with the university.39 These latter
rules, the Court said, included bans on paying players.
Lower courts, including the Ninth Circuit in In re National
Collegiate Athletic Association Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litigation (“Alston”),40 have properly read NCAA to exempt restraints
imposed by sports leagues from per se condemnation, regardless of
whether the restraint may produce redeeming virtues.41 As Professor
Hovenkamp has explained, this exemption would “shelter an
agreement between member schools fixing the price of admission
31. 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff’d, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
32. Id. at 1149–50.
33. Id.
34. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607–12 (1972).
35. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 707 F.2d at 1153–54.
36. Id.
37. Brief for Respondents at 23, Nat. Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (No. 83-271), 1984 WL 1036477,
*23.
38. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101.
39. Id. at 102.
40. 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020).
41. See, e.g., id. at 1256; O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1069–1070 (9th
Cir. 2015); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1017–1020 (10th Cir. 1998).
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tickets or of hot dogs purchased in the stands.”42 Unlike restraints
that merit Rule of Reason scrutiny because they survive the NPR
standard or the ancillary restraints test, restraints enjoying the
sports league exemption will necessarily include entire categories of
restraints that would ordinarily be unlawful per se because they
cannot produce redeeming virtues. Thus, courts cannot assume there
is some probability that such restraints might produce redeeming
virtues. Instead, courts must assume that application of NPR’s
second prong would condemn some such restraints as unlawful per se.
By invoking restraints not before it to justify the sports league
exemption, the Court assumed that such restraints would themselves
avoid per se condemnation. This assumption was surprising, given
the Court’s recent condemnation of apparently beneficial horizontal
restraints in decisions it expressly reaffirmed.43 While the Court
admitted that restrictions on player compensation prevented price
competition, it opined that unbridled rivalry for the services of
student athletes would transform the NCAA into a semi-professional
league, tarnishing the league’s brand—college football—associated
with an academic tradition.44 The Court analogized such restraints
to vertical agreements that simultaneously restricted intra-brand
rivalry but enhanced inter-brand competition by overcoming market
failure.45 Lower courts have read this language as retracting the
scope of the per se rule vis a vis horizontal restraints more generally.46
IV. THE SPORTS LEAGUE EXEMPTION HAS NO BASIS
NCAA’s sports league exemption saved numerous restraints,
including those before it, from a substantially overinclusive per se
rule.47 Many such restraints were likely procompetitive. Perhaps the
exemption was a second-best tactic for mitigating the anti-consumer
impact of an overly broad per se rule. The Supreme Court, however,
has undermined this justification by narrowing the scope of the per se
rule. Moreover, this exemption contradicts basic antitrust principles
and has produced other negative consequences, including an
additional and stronger exemption, as described below in Part V.
The Court did not explain why antitrust treatment of restraints
not before it determines the per se status of those restraints that are.
42. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The NCAA and the Rule of Reason, 52 REV.
INDUS. ORG. 323, 324–26 (2017) (reading NCAA in this manner); see also Alan J.
Meese, Competition and Market Failure in the Antitrust Jurisprudence of Justice
Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1775, 1791–92 (2006).
43. See, e.g., Topco, 405 U.S. at 608–12; see also NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99 &
nn.18–19 (citing Topco with approval).
44. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101–02.
45. Id. at 103 (“[A] restraint in a limited aspect of a market may actually
enhance market-wide competition.”).
46. Rothery Storage v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Polk Bros, Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188–89 (7th Cir. 1985).
47. See, e.g., O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1057.
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Horizontal cooperation is necessary to create and maintain numerous
other ventures besides sports leagues.48 However, courts do not
immunize restraints imposed by such other ventures from per se
condemnation simply because the restraints accompany a valid
venture. Instead, courts employ the ancillary restraints doctrine to
test whether such restraints might produce cognizable benefits that
further the venture and thus warrant an additional fact-based
assessment.49 The content and nature of this threshold inquiry
assumes that sometimes the answer to this question will be “no.” That
is, some restraints that accompany an otherwise valid joint venture
cannot produce any cognizable benefits but will instead simply reduce
rivalry simpliciter.50 Courts condemn such restraints while allowing
the venture to proceed.51
Robert Bork, who rehabilitated the ancillary restraints doctrine,
endorsed this approach in a path-breaking article.52 Bork explained
that horizontal restraints that accompanied lawful ventures were not
ancillary if they were “incapable of adding to the efficiency of the
integration which they seemingly accompany.”53 Bork instanced a
restrictive covenant that accompanied formation of a “product safety
testing laboratory” by horizontal rivals.54 The formation and
operation of the laboratory would constitute lawful concerted action,
just like formation and continued operation of the NCAA.55 Still,
Bork concluded that the covenant could not be ancillary and was thus
unlawful per se.56 Bork’s analysis confirms that is no reason to treat
48. See Alan J. Meese, Requiem for a Lightweight: How NCAA Continues to
Distort Antitrust Doctrine, 56 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2021).
49. Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d at 224 (“To be ancillary, and hence exempt
from the per se rule, an agreement eliminating competition must . . . serve[] to
make the main transaction more effective in accomplishing its purpose. Of course,
the restraint imposed must be related to the efficiency sought to be achieved.”)
(emphasis added).
50. See, e.g., In re Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C. 1174, 1275 (1979) (Pitofsky,
Commissioner), aff’d 657 F. 2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981); see also Polygram Holding v.
FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that a restraint that accompanied an
otherwise legitimate venture could produce no cognizable benefits).
51. See, e.g., Polygram Holding, 416 F.3d at 38–39.
52. See Bork, supra note 21, at 380; see also Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189 (“A
court must ask whether an agreement promoted enterprise and productivity at
the time it was adopted. If it arguably did, then the court must apply the Rule of
Reason . . . .”) (emphasis added).
53. Bork, supra note 21, at 383 (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 197–200 (2010) (treating
conduct of a corporation jointly owned by thirty-two NFL teams as concerted
action because agreement joined “independent centers of decision making”);
Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d at 214–15 (analogizing challenged restraints to those
challenged in Topco and NCAA and concluding that all such restraints were
concerted action).
56. Bork, supra note 21, at 382–84; id. at 384 (treating non-ancillary
restraints as unlawful per se). It should not matter that restraints that
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restraints that accompany sports leagues more favorably than those
that accompany other ventures when applying the NPR standard.
V. RETAINING THE SPORTS LEAGUE EXEMPTION DOES POSITIVE HARM
Perhaps the sports league exemption is a case of “no harm, no
foul.” Most exempted restraints would merit Rule of Reason scrutiny
under more recent applications of the NPR standard anyway.
Moreover, both NPR and Rule of Reason analysis ultimately ask
whether challenged restraints produce monopoly or its
consequences.57 Per se condemnation reflects a conclusion that Rule
of Reason analysis will condemn the restraint.58 As shown below,
however, the sports league exemption still does positive harm, both
by weakening the per se rule and also by distorting related aspects of
antitrust doctrines. In particular, the exemption has contributed to a
distortion of the methodology of Rule of Reason analysis that courts
apply and not merely those adopted by sports leagues.
A. The Sports League Exemption Deters Legitimate Challenges
and Increases False Negatives.
Full-blown Rule of Reason analysis is not free. Plaintiffs must
expend resources to establish a prima facie case by proving either: (1)
the restraint produces actual detrimental effects or (2) the parties
possess the economic power necessary to impose harm.59 Defendants
can contest these assertions, further increasing adjudication costs.
Plaintiffs fail to establish such a case 97 percent of the time.60
Presumably, numerous potential plaintiffs do not attempt such a
showing, leaving harmful restraints unchallenged. Knowing this,
defendants will, at the margin, adopt some unambiguously harmful
restraints they otherwise would not have adopted, knowing, as they
will, that the sports league exemption will raise the bar for plaintiffs
challenging such restraints.61 In sum, the sports league exemption
both increases the number of false negatives and encourages
additional harmful restraints.

accompany a joint venture “are likely to survive the Rule of Reason” in the context
of sports leagues. See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 203. This is equally true with
respect to restraints that accompany other joint ventures.
57. Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 692–93 (explaining that the per se
rule and full-blown Rule of Reason scrutiny are “two complimentary categories of
Rule of Reason analysis” and that “[i]n either event, the purpose of the analysis
is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint”).
58. See Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc., 457 U.S. at 344.
59. See Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 827 (6th Cir. 2011)
(describing these alternative means of establishing a prima facie case).
60. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st
Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 827–29; 837 (2009).
61. This impact will also alter the ratio of harmful to beneficial restraints in
this category.
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B. The Sports League Exemption Distorts the Rule of Reason
Methodology That Courts Employ.
Rule of Reason methodology should turn upon the nature of
possible redeeming virtues that save restraints from per se
condemnation. Application of the NPR standard and ancillary
restraints doctrine, both of which NCAA ignored, identifies the
relevant virtues, if any, that restraints might produce. If such virtues
are technological, the three-part Rule of Reason test applied in Alston
and informed by NCAA is generally appropriate.62 Proof of higher
prices (or in Alston, reduced compensation) should establish a prima
facie case, casting upon the defendants a burden to adduce evidence
of such efficiencies.63 If defendants satisfy this burden, plaintiffs can
prove a less restrictive alternative or show that the restraint’s harms
exceed its benefits.64 This framework assumes whatever benefits
defendants prove coexist with the harms that plaintiffs purportedly
demonstrated to establish a prima facie case.65
However, some restraints survive per se condemnation because
they may produce non-technological efficiencies by overcoming

62. Alston, 958 F.3d at 1256 (invoking and applying Rule of Reason’s threepart framework).
63. NCAA opined that the defendants there bore a “heavy burden of
establishing an affirmative defense[.]” Nat. Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. Of
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984). Such an approach makes
sense with respect to explicit price and/or output restraints that apparently
cannot produce redeeming virtues. However, lower courts, including Alston, have
generalized this language, applying this standard to restraints that would
survive per se condemnation under the NPR standard because they may produce
redeeming virtues. See Alston, 958 F.3d at 1257 (describing the NCAA’s “‘heavy
burden’” of “‘competitively justify[ing]’” its undisputed “‘deviation from the
operations of a free market’” under the Rule of Reason) (quoting NCAA, 468 U.S.
at 113)). There is, however, no warrant for imposing upon defendants more than
the traditional burden of production when a restraint properly survives per se
condemnation under the NPR standard. See Meese, supra note 16, at 108 n.156
(collecting authorities characterizing defendants’ burden as a burden of
production). Thus, exemption of the naked restraints before it from per se
condemnation resulted in a misleading and non-generalizable pronouncement
regarding this aspect of Rule of Reason analysis.
64. The exact nature of this balancing, of course, will depend on the welfare
standard that the court selects. See generally Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol,
The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic Approach, 78
ANTITRUST L.J. 471 (2012).
65. Cf. Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Trade-offs, 58 AMER. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). See also Law, 134 F.3d at 1017
(holding that, after plaintiffs make out a prima facie case, “[t]he inquiry then
shifts to an evaluation of whether the procompetitive virtues of the alleged
wrongful conduct justifies the otherwise anticompetitive impacts” (emphasis
added)).
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market failure.66 Here, a price-based standard makes no sense. If
restraints overcome market failure, pre-restraint prices reflect a
poorly functioning market that the restraint corrects. Such prices are
not a useful benchmark for comparison to post-restraint prices.
Instead, proof that post-restraint prices exceed the pre-restraint
baseline is entirely consistent with a conclusion that the agreement
overcomes a market failure and produces redeeming virtues, the
prospect of which resulted in Rule of Reason treatment.67 Antitrust
procedure thus precludes allowing plaintiffs to prevail based solely
upon such evidence.68
Moreover, once a plaintiff does make out a prima facie case in
whatever way, proof that the restraint produces significant nontechnological benefits undermines the rationale for balancing
benefits against harms. Such balancing presumes that the restraint
produces simultaneous harms and benefits, like a merger to monopoly
that generates economies of scale that may offset the transaction’s
harms.69 However, a defendant’s showing that a restraint overcomes
a market failure undermines the assumption that benefits coexist
with harms.70 Instead, the evidence is at least equally consistent with
the conclusion that the restraint only produces benefits—benefits
that manifest themselves as prices higher than those produced by the
pre-restraint, poorly functioning market.71 Similar logic undermines
the search for “less restrictive” alternatives, because there is no
reason to assume that the challenged restraint is “restrictive” in the
first place.
The sports league exemption deprives courts of the information
necessary to ascertain what Rule of Reason methodology makes
sense. Alston may be such a case.
C. The Exemption Encouraged Adoption of an Ill-Considered
“Quick Look” Methodology of Rule of Reason Analysis.
The restraint before the Court in NCAA expressly set price and
output. Without identifying any redeeming virtues, the Court

66. Alan J. Meese, Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting: How the
Ghost of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, 1 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 21
(2005).
67. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,
878, 882–85, 889–90, 893, 896–98 (2007) (holding that higher retail prices
resulting from additional promotion are not antitrust harm).
68. Meese, supra note 16, at 100–01.
69. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The
Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AMER. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
70. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anticompetitive
Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L. J. 209,
278, 278 nn.216–17 (1986) (explaining that courts often treat proof of efficiencies
as reason to scrutinize more carefully claims that the restraint produced harms
in the first place).
71. See Meese, supra note 16, at 163–65.
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nonetheless assessed the restraints under the Rule of Reason,
because they accompanied a sports league and were thus exempt from
the NPR standard.72 The Court began by invoking the District
Court’s findings that the restraint had increased prices compared to
a (hypothetical) non-restraint baseline.73 Absent possible redeeming
virtues, this price-based method of making out a prima facie case
made perfect sense. Nonetheless, the NCAA contended that the
plaintiffs’ case should fail absent proof that the defendants possessed
sufficient shares of a properly defined market.74
The Court could have invoked its ultimate conclusion that the
defendants did, in fact, possess a large share of a properly defined
market.75 Instead, the Court issued a broader pronouncement,
applicable well-beyond the case before it, regardless of a defendant’s
market position. In a passage that quoted National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States,76 the Court announced:
As a matter of law, the absence of proof of market power does
not justify a naked restriction on price or output. To the
contrary, when there is an agreement not to compete in terms
of price or output, ‘no elaborate industry analysis is required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an
agreement.’77

The Court also quoted Professor Areeda’s assertion that some
restraints were so obviously harmful that courts could condemn them
“‘in the twinkling of an eye.’”78
The Court’s quotation of Professional Engineers suggests that it
equated “naked” restraints with those that could not produce
redeeming virtues.79 Combined with the “twinkling of an eye”
metaphor, this language inspired the so-called “Quick Look”
methodology of Rule of Reason analysis.80 Under this approach,
plaintiffs may avoid establishing actual detrimental effects or market
power if they convince the tribunal that, while not unlawful per se,
72. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 107–08.
73. See id. at 104–108. While the Court also claimed that the restraints had
reduced output, it made no effort to adjust that reduction for the quality of the
remaining games. Id.
74. Brief for Petitioner at 33–34, NCAA, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (No. 83-271).
75. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 111–113; see also id. at 115, 115 n.55 (resting the
rejection of one of the defendants’ justifications on finding that the defendants
possessed market power).
76. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
77. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 (quoting Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 692).
78. See id. at 109 n.39 (quoting Phillip Areeda, The “Rule of Reason” in
Antitrust Analysis: General Issues 37–38 (Federal Judicial Center, June 1981)
(parenthetical omitted), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/Antitrust.pdf
(last visited June 9, 2021).
79. See Meese, supra note 42, at 1780, 1789–91, 1800 (reading Professional
Engineers in this manner).
80. Id. at 1801–02.
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the restraint is nonetheless “inherently suspect.”81 Initially, some
proponents touted the Quick Look as a pro-defendant “safety valve”
that tempered an overbroad per se rule.82
As a matter of decision theory, this approach makes perfect sense
in a case like NCAA. If a particular class of restraint is usually
anticompetitive and rarely, if ever, produces benefits, the chance of
false positives is extremely low. Reducing plaintiffs’ burden of
establishing a prima facie case would (properly) encourage such
challenges and minimize the resources expended on litigation.
However, advocates and courts have not confined the Quick Look
to restraints deemed “naked” because they lack redeeming virtues.83
Indeed, the Alston plaintiffs began their argument before the
Supreme Court by attempting to expand the definition of “naked,”
contending that the challenged restraints were “naked,” despite the
finding below that they produced significant benefits.84 Moreover,
scholars and courts have held out the possibility that a restraint may
be inherently suspect and thus subject to the Quick Look, regardless
of whether it is “naked” as defined by NCAA.85 Once courts and
agencies created the Quick Look methodology, plaintiffs naturally
pressed courts to declare numerous restraints “inherently suspect,”
hoping to eliminate the burden of establishing antitrust harm.86 The
result has been an increase in expensive and distracting disputes
about whether various restraints are “inherently suspect”—disputes
that defendants almost always win.87 The cost of such disputes
produces no offsetting social benefits, as failure to establish that a
restraint is inherently suspect relegates plaintiffs to the standard
requirement to prove anticompetitive harm anyway.
To be sure, a more expansive definition of “inherently suspect”
could seemingly lighten plaintiffs’ burdens in a larger number of
cases. However, proponents of the Quick Look have not offered a
81. See, e.g., Polygram Holding v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 32–33, 36–37 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (detailing and applying this approach).
82. See Meese, supra note 21, at 873.
83. See, e.g., Polygram, 416 F.3d at 35 (detailing this approach).
84. Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, NCAA v. Alston, No. 20-512 (Mar.
31, 2021).
85. See Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization:
The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 777–81 (2012)
(endorsing application of the Quick Look to restraints regardless of how they
avoid per se condemnation); Meese, supra note 21, at 866 n.165 (collecting
numerous decisions asking whether numerous restraints, including exclusive
dealing contracts, are “inherently suspect”).
86. See Meese, supra note 21, at 864–65 (describing plaintiffs’ strong
incentives to convince tribunals that challenged restraints are “inherently
suspect” so as to avoid almost certain failure to establish a prima facie case under
standard Rule of Reason analysis); id. at 863 (explaining that the first step in
Rule of Reason analysis is to ask whether a restraint is inherently suspect).
87. Id. at 866 n.165 (collecting numerous decisions evaluating and (nearly)
always rejecting plaintiff’s claim that restraint was “inherently suspect”).
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tractable methodology for distinguishing “inherently suspect”
restraints from those properly assessed under full-blown Rule of
Reason analysis.88 Absent such a methodology, the pro-plaintiff
Quick Look is probably best reserved for those restraints that do not
merit Rule of Reason scrutiny in the first place—a set that would be
empty if courts properly and uniformly applied the NPR standard and
ancillary restraints test.
In any event, the Quick Look has always rested on shaky
jurisprudential ground.89 NCAA’s suggestion that the nakedness of a
restraint itself establishes a prima facie case was dicta, given the
district court’s finding that the restraint produced actual detrimental
effects.90
Moreover, Professor Areeda’s “twinkling of an eye”
metaphor described a hypothetical case in which courts determined
at the summary judgment stage that defendants possessed a
dominant market position and thus market power.91 This conclusion
did not support any suggestion that the mere existence of a restraint,
no matter how apparently harmful, could itself establish a prima facie
case.92 Finally, while the Supreme Court has endorsed the Quick
Look in concept,93 it has never condemned a restraint under the Rule
of Reason without first finding that the agreement produced concrete
anticompetitive harm.94
Moreover, NCAA’s assertion that “naked” restraints should
themselves establish a prima facie case regardless of market share or
anticompetitive effects was dicta, given the Court’s holding that the
plaintiffs had in fact established market power and actual
detrimental effects. Finally, the actual agreement before the Court,
which could not produce redeeming virtues, bore little meaningful
resemblance to restraints such as those in Alston that could produce
such virtues. It would thus be hazardous, to say the least, to
generalize these dicta to apply to potentially beneficial restraints.95
Indeed, the only restraints that would seem analogous to those before
the NCAA Court are those that should be condemned as unlawful per
se in the first place. NCAA’s unjustified exemption of the restraints
88. See id. at 876–80.
89. See Alan J. Meese, The Rule of Reason’s Prima Facie Case: Did Harvard
Get it Right?, 168 U. PENN. L. REV. ONLINE (2021) (forthcoming).
90. See Meese, supra note 21, at 856 & n.104 (explaining why this language
was dicta).
91. See Areeda, supra note 78, at 37–38.
92. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
93. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
94. See Meese, supra note 21, at 856 & n.104 (explaining that Supreme Court
decisions endorsing or implying a Quick Look approach are dicta); see also, e.g.,
Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 770–81 (rejecting application of the Quick Look to
the case before it).
95. See generally Neal Devins & Alan J. Meese, Judicial Review and
Nongeneralizable Cases, 32 FLA. STATE L. REV. 323 (2005) (contending that
precedents adopted in cases with idiosyncratic facts may not reflect appropriate
consideration of factors that should inform the resulting rule).
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before it from per se condemnation thus inspired a methodology of
Rule of Reason analysis that was in fact only appropriate for
restraints that were not properly subject to Rule of Reason analysis
in the first place.
D.

NCAA Inspired a New and More Powerful Exemption.
NCAA spawned another, more powerful exemption, one squarely
before the Court in Alston. The Quick Look’s logic cuts both ways. If
some restraints that survive per se condemnation are almost always
harmful on balance, presumably some are nearly always beneficial.
An antitrust regime could reflect this fact, making it especially
difficult for plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case and/or easier for
defendants to rebut such a case. Over a decade ago, the Seventh
Circuit embraced such logic, holding that a NCAA Bylaw is
“presumed procompetitive” when it is “clearly meant to help maintain
the ‘revered tradition of amateurism in college sports’ or the
‘preservation of the student-athlete in higher education.’”96 The court
built upon dicta in American Needle, Inc v. National Football
League,97 which itself invoked NCAA’s mistranslation of Professor
Areeda’s “twinkling of an eye” metaphor.98
Defendants have invoked this line of precedent, albeit without
the term “Quick Look,” preferring instead the phrase “twinkling of an
eye.”99 Indeed, this pro-defendant approach is really a rule of per se
legality and thus an outright exemption from antitrust scrutiny for
covered restraints because the “presumption” in favor of such
restraints is irrebuttable.100 It is likely no coincidence that this prodefendant irrebuttable presumption arose in the context of sports
leagues in general and the question of student athlete eligibility in
particular. After all, the very existence of NCAA’s sports league
exemption broadcasts that “sports are different” and are therefore
susceptible to more relaxed antitrust scrutiny than more mundane
commercial endeavors. Thus, a pro-plaintiff methodology born from
96. See Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 498, 501, 503 (7th Cir. 2018); Agnew v.
NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 342–43 (7th Cir. 2012). But see O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802
F.3d 1049, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting this approach and assessing
restrictions under the Rule of Reason).
97. 560 U.S. 183 (2010).
98. Id. at 203; see also Agnew, 683 F.3d at 341 (quoting Am. Needle, 560 U.S.
at 203).
99. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 19–20, 24–25, Nat. Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. Alston, No. 20-512 (Oct. 2020) (invoking Agnew and Deppe); see also
Transcript, supra note 84, at 7 (NCAA disclaiming reliance on the term Quick
Look). Of course, the NCAA is seeking more than what the Quick Look provides
plaintiffs.
100. See Deppe, 893 F.3d at 501–502 (holding that courts should dismiss
challenges to such restraints on the pleadings without opportunity for rebuttal);
Agnew, 683 F. 3d at 343, n.6 (same); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110, 119 (1989) (plurality opinion) (explaining that an irrebuttable presumption
is really a substantive rule).
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an unjustified sports league exemption has morphed into a second
and more ironclad exemption. This Essay contends that the Court
should reject this exemption as contrary to antitrust doctrine and
policy.101
VI. WHAT THE COURT CAN DO ABOUT IT IN ALSTON
What, then, can the Supreme Court do to correct for this
untethered and harmful sports league exemption and the subsequent
doctrinal consequences described above? Most aggressively, the
Court could order re-argument and add three questions for
consideration: (1) are all restraints imposed by sports leagues exempt
from per se condemnation under the NPR standard?; (2) do restraints
such as those reviewed in Alston possibly produce redeeming virtues?;
and (3) if so, what are those virtues? After such re-argument, the
Court could overrule that portion of NCAA creating the sports league
exemption, while reiterating the condemnation of express limitations
on price and output of televised games.102 The Court would then have
to face the question that has eluded a fully considered decision since
1984, namely, whether horizontal restrictions on player
compensation can produce redeeming virtues and thus survive per se
condemnation under the NPR standard.
The Court could also take a different approach altogether,
confining itself to the present record and arguments. The Court could
still begin by noting that it is only applying the exemption arguendo
because neither party challenged it. It could also note that it
generated the exemption when courts misapplied the NPR standard
and banned bona fide ancillary restraints, such that the exemption
saved
many
procompetitive
restraints
from
wrongful
condemnation.103 The Court could then note that, given today’s more
accurate application of the NPR standard, the exemption no longer
performs this function.104 Such a statement could encourage lower
courts to abandon the exemption, teeing up Supreme Court review.
Application of the exemption would ordinarily preclude
consideration of whether the challenged restraints might produce
redeeming virtues until after the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case. But the Alston Court could answer this question before a fullblown analysis. The defendants’ bid to exempt their restraints from
even Rule of Reason scrutiny necessarily assumes that such
restraints usually, or even always, produce redeeming virtues by
protecting and enhancing the amateur nature of NCAA sports from

101. See infra notes 122–28 and accompanying text.
102. Transcript, supra note 84, at 33.
103. Cf. Meese, supra note 21, at 873 (describing assertions by proponents of
the “Quick Look” Rule of Reason analysis that this approach could soften an overinclusive per se rule).
104. See id. at 873–74 (explaining how more selective application of the per se
rule eliminated any putative need for “safety valve” function of the Quick Look).
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unbridled rivalry for players.105 While not a sufficient condition for
such an exemption, this assumption is certainly necessary.106
Recent commentary and some questions at oral argument,
however, seem to take issue with this threshold assumption by, for
instance, analogizing limits on player compensation to putative limits
on coaches’ salaries.107 The latter, of course, would be unlawful per se
absent the sports league exemption.108 Indeed, the plaintiff began its
oral argument by characterizing the restraints before the Court as
“naked horizontal monopsony restraints that would be per se
unlawful in any context.”109
This Essay submits that the NCAA dicta correctly signaled that
agreements restricting player compensation could create redeeming
virtues, notwithstanding Nick Saban’s unregulated salary.110 To be
sure, the restraints restrict atomistic rivalry for players. But as
Standard Oil itself recognized, some agreements that restrict
atomistic rivalry have the “legitimate purpose of reasonably
forwarding personal interest and developing trade” and are thus not
unreasonable.111 The Court in Sylvania concurred, explaining that
some restrictions on “a purely competitive situation” can overcome
free riding, correct a market failure, and enhance inter-brand
competition.112 There is no reason to suspend this logic because the
restraints govern buying rather than selling.113 NCAA’s dicta, which
addressed the validity of compensation limits, expressly invoked
Sylvania, suggesting that such restraints could “enhance marketwide competition.”114
Sylvania and NCAA assumed that product differentiation is
beneficial. Moreover, the “more accurate economic conceptions” that
courts must apply when assessing restraints in “the light of reason”
bolster NCAA’s assertion that unbridled rivalry will produce
insufficient differentiation.115 Imagine that schools could include
non-students on teams, perhaps providing compensation equal to the

105. See Brief for Petitioner at 9–11, 18–21, Nat. Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v.
Alston, No. 20-512 (Mar. 31, 2021).
106. Of course, under a straightforward application of the NPR standard or
ancillary restraints doctrine, courts would have asked and answered this
question earlier in the process of assessing these restraints.
107. See Transcript, supra note 84, at 10 (Thomas, J., asking question).
108. See generally Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n, 134 F. 3d 1010 (10th
Cir. 1998).
109. Transcript, supra note 84, at 42.
110. See generally Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
111. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
112. Cont‘l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977).
113. Id. at 54.
114. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103.
115. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 55, 63.
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cost of attendance.116 Each team would fully internalize the private
benefits of including non-students. These benefits could include, for
example, improved winning percentages. But no school would
internalize the full impact of such participation upon the nature of
the product. If a few schools chose this route, others would
predictably follow suit, producing an equilibrium where few, if any,
schools fielded teams exclusively populated by students. Only a
horizontal agreement preventing rostering non-students would
reliably prevent a race to the bottom that would transform college
football into a football team owned by a college but full of nonstudents.
The agreement just described is as “pernicious” under NPR as
one restricting player compensation.117 Both restrict rivalry for
inputs. But plaintiffs have properly declined to challenge such
restrictions.118 This concession reflects recognition that unbridled
rivalry over the composition of rosters would produce a market failure
manifesting itself in negative differentiation of the NCAA’s product,
reduced inter-brand competition, and decreased consumer welfare.119
Translated into the NPR standard and ancillary restraints test, such
restrictions can produce redeeming virtues and enhance the efficiency
of an otherwise valid venture.
Defendants’ bid for a stronger exemption regarding
compensation restrictions rests upon a similar claim. Unbridled
compensation rivalry, they say, will result in an additional market
failure, also undermining the quality of the NCAA’s product and
reducing demand.120 Indeed, plaintiffs have asserted that the
challenged restraints reduce student-athlete compensation compared
to what unfettered rivalry will produce.121
Such limits on
compensation rivalry reinforce the requirement that participants be
students. If schools could pay whatever the market would bear, the
supply of non-student labor would increase significantly, in both
116. The analysis propounded by this paragraph does not depend upon the
provision of such compensation.
117. See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text.
118. Transcript, supra note 84, at 50–51 (“[O]f course, we’re not challenging
any restrictions or rules regarding that they be students.”).
119. Id. at 50 (articulating the plaintiffs’ contention that the main distinction
between professional and collegiate athletics is that the latter is exclusively
comprised of students).
120. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap
Antitrust Litig. (“Alston”), 958 F.3d 1239, 1248–50, 1257–58, 1260, 1268 (9th Cir.
2020).
121. See id. at 1256–57 (describing the district court’s finding that elite
student-athletes are “forced to accept . . . whatever compensation is offered to
them”). If this is truly the case, then one might ask why the NCAA does not
replicate the approach taken by the Ivy League, that is, ban members from
providing any athletic financial aid. See Prospective Athlete Information, THE IVY
LEAGUE, https://ivyleague.com/sports/2017/7/28/information-psa-index.aspx (last
visited June 9, 2021).
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numbers and quality, thus increasing schools’ temptation to include
non-student participants and undermining the “student-only” policy.
The defendants, district court, and Ninth Circuit agree that the
propensity of a restraint to prevent unbridled compensation rivalry
helps differentiate collegiate from professional sports, improving
consumer welfare.122 They only disagree as to the magnitude of
benefits and as to whether the restrictions are broader than
necessary.123 Thus, both lower courts agreed that restrictions on
compensation unrelated to education—that is, restrictions that
prevent the payment of an outright salary—are procompetitive, even
though such restrictions extinguish the very rivalry that would
produce the largest increase in student-athlete compensation.124
Indeed, one implication of Alston’s result is that a less restrictive
means of achieving the objective would entail voluntary integration,
independent of any exercise of market power.125 No one has
articulated a similar account of how limiting coaching staffs to
students, for instance, or limiting coaches’ salaries to the cost of
attendance, would distinguish the quality of the product that schools
offer to paying fans in a manner that would appeal to consumers.126
However, a conclusion that compensation restraints may produce
redeeming virtues is simply a necessary condition for application of
the player eligibility exemption. Proponents must also explain why
this stronger exemption is superior to Rule of Reason scrutiny.
Hopefully, the Court will reject this proposed new exemption, at least
for now. As explained in Subpart V.C of this Essay, the basis for the

122. See, e.g., Alston, 958 F.3d at 1246–47, 1256–57, 1260.
123. See id. at 1254, 1257 (“The NCAA does, however, quarrel with the district
court’s analysis at the Rule of Reason’s second step[.]”).
124. See id. at 1254–55, 1258 (“Not paying student-athletes ‘unlimited
payments unrelated to education, akin to salaries seen in professional sports
leagues’ is what makes them ‘amateurs.’” (quoting In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. (“Alston”), 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058,
1083 (N.D. Cal. 2019))).
125. The Ivy League, which provides no athletic scholarships, provides an
example of such horizontal voluntary integration that would be difficult to
attribute to market power. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit in Alston apparently
assumed that individual conferences could, without market power, impose
restraints identical to those the court invalidated. See Alston, 958 F.3d at 1256–
57; see also Rothery Storage v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(stating that absence of market power established that defendants adopted
challenged practice to “make the conduct of their business more effective”);
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 22 & n.39 (1979)
(highlighting the fact that firms without market power had adopted a practice
similar to challenged restraint, thereby suggesting that the practice might be
reasonable).
126. Cf. Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F. 3d 1010, 1021–24 (10th
Cir. 1998) (describing and rejecting different purported redeeming virtues that
supposedly justified limits on the salaries of so-called “restricted earnings
coaches”).
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original Quick Look, on which American Needle’s dicta tried to build,
was questionable at best.127
Therefore, the pro-plaintiff Quick Look has very little to
recommend it and is surely no model for further doctrinal evolution
that completely shields some concerted action from Sherman Act
scrutiny. NCAA’s apparent endorsement of “a great majority of such
restrictions” was dicta and rested in part upon a concession by
plaintiffs—the University of Georgia and the University of
Oklahoma—with strong economic interests to preserve such
restrictions.128 Even on their own terms, these dicta conceded that
some such restrictions did not enhance competition, thereby implying
that courts should assess such restraints under the Rule of Reason to
separate the wheat from the chaff.
Proponents of narrowing the scope of per se rules in favor of fullblown Rule of Reason analysis in other contexts have persuasively
explained that such fact-intensive scrutiny can generate information
about the actual impact of restraints previously condemned, thereby
informing future assessment regarding whether something other
than full-blown analysis is appropriate.129 Such scrutiny can also
help parties, courts, and scholars hone their theoretical conceptions
regarding how to think about the impact of such restraints and what
questions a tribunal should ask when examining them. By analogy,
the exemption sought by the defendants would prevent the generation
of information about the impact of exempted agreements that
decisions such as O’Bannon and Alston have themselves produced,
information that scholars and practitioners alike can employ to assess
their true economic effect. Perhaps such assessments would confirm
defendants’ assumption regarding the uniformly procompetitive
nature of such agreements, but perhaps not.
Of course, at least in the short run, a full-blown Rule of Reason
assessment will consume more resources than the defendants’ new
exemption. But this would be true of any exemption from ordinary
full-blown analysis. Moreover, this putative benefit is partly illusory.
Once parties understand that inclusion in a particular category will
obviate Rule of Reason scrutiny, defendants will predictably invest
resources attempting to convince courts that restraints in fact fall into
this category, while plaintiffs will invest resources to prove the
opposite.130 These additional litigation-related investments will
127. See supra Subpart V.D.
128. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 103 (1984) (“Respondents concede that the great majority of the NCAA’s
regulations enhance competition among member institutions.”).
129. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope
and Content of the Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 461, 488–89 & nn.113–14
(2000); see also Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) (suggesting
that courts can ultimately dispense with full-blown Rule of Reason assessment
“if rule-of-reason analyses in case after case reach identical conclusions”).
130. See Meese, supra note 21, at 863–66.
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partly offset the savings from eliminating full-blown scrutiny.
Finally, as noted earlier, the prospect of complete exemption from any
antitrust scrutiny will encourage potential defendants to adopt some
eligibility related restraints that are anticompetitive on balance,
knowing as they will that such restraints will be immune from
antitrust scrutiny.131
Assuming the Court does reject the defendant’s bid for a new
exemption, it will finally have to wrestle with the problem that
consumed the Ninth Circuit—namely, application of the full-blown
Rule of Reason to the challenged restraints. Here, NCAA itself
strongly bolsters the Ninth Circuit’s approach, which found that
plaintiffs had established a prima facie case by showing that, but for
the restraints, NCAA members would have provided greater
compensation to student-athletes—at least those playing football and
basketball.132 However, as explained in Part V.B of this Essay, this
approach seems to contradict the apparent rationale for rejecting per
se condemnation of such restraints in the first place.133 After all, if
such restraints do in fact avoid per se condemnation, they do so
because they may produce non-technological efficiencies by
eliminating or attenuating a market failure.134 Thus, proof that such
restraints reduce player compensation below the level that unbridled
rivalry would produce is unremarkable given that such restraints
would properly survive per se condemnation in the first place.135 That
is, a conclusion that such proof establishes a prima facie case rests
upon an arbitrary choice between two entirely different accounts of
the impact of such restraints; one reflecting a harmful exercise of
market power and the other reflecting an entirely beneficial example
of horizontal voluntary integration, closely analogous to the
numerous almost mundane restraints agreed upon by franchisees
upon entry into a particular franchise system.136
To be sure, the plaintiffs have also convinced the Ninth Circuit
that the defendants possess market power—indeed, a monopsony—in
a properly defined relevant market, although defendants apparently
stipulated this market.137
Still, even dominant firms enter
131. See supra Subpart V.D.
132. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104–07 (invoking the finding that challenged
restraints resulted in higher prices and reduced output compared to a nonrestraint baseline to establish prima facie case).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 62–71.
134. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
135. See Meese, supra note 16, at 149–52.
136. Id.; see also Alan J. Meese, Intrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the
Firm, 83 N.C. L. REV. 5, 69 & nn.312–14 (2004) (collecting authorities
demonstrating that franchising contracts are horizontal).
137. See In re. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap
Antitrust Litig. (“Alston”), 958 F.3d 1239, 1248, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020) (reporting
that district court adopted this market definition at “the parties’ request”), cert
granted sub nom. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 1231 (2020)
(mem.).
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agreements that overcome market failures and produce benefits.138
Proof that such a firm has entered a contract does not, without more,
logically give rise to a presumption that the agreement produces
antitrust harm. This is so even if the restraint produces prices that
are higher than those that a non-restraint world would create. Only
proof that the challenged restraint reduces output, properly defined,
would, as a logical matter, suffice to establish a prima facie case.139
However, plaintiffs apparently made no attempt to define the proper
measure of output in this context or link the imposition of the
restraints to any reduction in that measure.
The Court could therefore reverse and remand for additional
assessment of whether the plaintiffs have established a prima facie
case. The plaintiffs would thus have an opportunity to define the
proper measure of output and prove that the restraint reduced output
measured in this manner.
In any event, regardless of how the plaintiffs have established a
prima facie case, the defendants have in fact satisfied their burden of
producing evidence that the challenged restraints produce significant
benefits. If the defendants had not discharged this burden, there
would have been no need for the plaintiffs to adduce evidence of a less
restrictive alternative that supposedly produces identical benefits.
Moreover, as explained earlier, proof of such benefits further
undermines any presumption that a restraint produces
anticompetitive harm, in this case, by establishing that the
agreement overcomes a market failure.140 As a result, there is no
rationale for calculating the magnitude of these benefits or comparing
such benefits to presumed harms—because there is no longer any
reason to presume that such harms exist. Indeed, proof that the
restraint in fact overcomes a market failure both negates any
presumption of harm and establishes that the restraint produces
benefits, thus requiring a conclusion that the practice unambiguously
improves welfare.
Proponents of the lower court’s decision may respond that courts
should nonetheless assess whether there is a less restrictive means of
achieving the same benefits as the challenged restraints. Proof that
such an alternative exists, they might say, suggests that the
defendants have adopted the restraint mainly or just partly to
exercise market power. But any such argument begins with the
assumption that the restraints are restrictive to begin with. Absent
138. See Alan J. Meese, Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the
Firm, 89 MINN. L. REV. 743, 845 (2005) (explaining that some “exclusionary
agreements can overcome market failures” and result in “significant cognizable
benefits”).
139. See Hovenkamp, supra note 42, at 324 (“The plaintiff generally makes
out a prima facie case by finding an anticompetitive effect, which means either a
restraint that tends to reduce output or that excludes a significant firm or
firms.”).
140. See supra Subpart V.B.
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evidence that the restraints have reduced output, proof that they in
fact overcome a market failure that would have manifested as lower
pre-restraint prices undermines any presumption that such
restraints are restrictive in the first place.

